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Robert Gast on NSA Surveillance Programs

Robert Gast on NSA Surveillance Programs

Previously, Gary Hipple wrote a piece very critical of the controversial NSA activities and what he views as serious infringements on our Constitutional right to privacy. He characterized the surveillance and intercept activities as pervasive, but also ineffective. In this piece, Bob Gast defends the programs, describing them as lawful, effective, and certainly under close supervision. 

 

CAUTION: THINK HARD BEFORE RESTRICTING

OUR INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

 

By Robert S. Gast, II

 

During the past several months the subjects of freedom, security and privacy have been widely discussed both in the print and electronic media.  Much of this interest was prompted, of course, by revelations from Eric Snowden regarding the extent of data gathering operations conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA), coupled with dire predictions from various pundits that freedom from unreasonable government intrusion and personal privacy were being eroded substantially.  I believe, however, that while a healthy level of concern and vigorous examination by Congress is certainly justified, such inquiries must be tempered by a generous dose of common sense and a realistic understanding of the relationship between privacy/freedom and security in modern society.

It is quite clear that we live in a very dangerous world and  threats from various fanatic groups are not only on-going, but potentially even more ominous than the tragic events of 9/11.  Death to westerners and particularly US citizens is a common theme of these groups, and their fervor, oft times justified by extremist religious beliefs, is unrelenting.  Everyone including women and children are fair game. We also cannot assume that any international strictures against the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons will serve as a viable deterrent to potential attacks.  Furthermore, nearly all of these potential adversaries are found in small, loosely connected groups, frequently from the same clan or even family, making “traditional” methods of investigation such as penetration with informants extremely difficult.  So the question is, “Where and when do our Intelligence Agencies initiate an inquiry”, and how do they gather information that can protect us on a timely basis?

Relying solely upon the results of a future investigation and possible prosecution after a catastrophic attack such as 9/11 is clearly not an option since the American people, the President, and Congress were unanimous in declaring that this was never to happen again. The watchword became, “We don’t give a damn what you have to do to prevent a recurrence, just prevent it“.  Among some of the key actions taken were the passage of the Patriot Act, and enhanced efforts by the NSA to penetrate the communications systems of various terrorist groups and their supporters.

Prior to 9/11 the ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to monitor communications, and more importantly, share information between various agencies, was severely restricted by Congress.  This had a significant bearing on the IC’s  ability to “ connect the dots”–or as one of my CIA colleagues recently said,  “Hell, we didn’t even know what the dots were”!

Hearings in Congress regarding the NSA Surveillance programs have been concentrated on several issues that deserve comment.  Among these are the “lack of transparency of the program”,  “lack of verifiable data as to the program’s effectiveness” and “the unnecessarily broad scope of the data gathering leading to privacy violations of everyday Americans”.  While frustrating to the media and many in Congress, the manner in which this program is handled is completely understandable and justified when one considers the fact that a full explanation of results and techniques would be a “god-send” to the enemy.  I see little use in giving the enemy our playbook or a summary of our successful counter-terrorism achievements, since they would quickly adjust their tactics accordingly. Indeed, the disclosures to date have allowed adversaries to learn how to avoid detection, and according to GEN Keith Alexander, the head of the NSA, have “caused significant and irreversible damage” to our national security.

It should also be stressed that despite the vast amount of raw data that is collected, the NSA and the IC cannot just willy-nilly wander the haystack searching for that elusive needle of data. The agencies, instead, are under rules that restrict their searches for data only “when there is a reasonable, articulable justification, and only those involving communications with terrorists abroad”, GEN Alexander has stressed.

To critics who say our successes have been minimal, we should point to comments from Senator Diane Feinstein, the Chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, who has said repeatedly that the NSA program has been of significant value to our counterterrorism efforts.   However, Senator Feinstein and others “in the know”, such as General Alexander,  are at a distinct disadvantage in defending the program in detail since public disclosure would give valuable intelligence to the bad guys.    Recently there have also been various claims that only “one or two viable threats” have been identified through the NSA program, so the value of these surveillances is questionable.  I rather doubt that these same critics would be so vocal if one of these so-called “viable threats “mentioned the use of biological agents in the subway of a major US city.  Choosing between a vigorous NSA surveillance program with only “one or two hits” and the deaths of thousands of innocent Americans then becomes somewhat more difficult.  Incidentally I have heard from various sources that the number of potential threats that have been identified, and likely foiled, has been much higher – perhaps in the hundreds.

My concern is that the current series of “revelations” about NSA spying and the “hyping” of these stories by the media will lead to an over-reaction by congress and a crippling set of restrictions that will put our country at serious risk.  We should all remember that the enemy is not dumb and will exploit gaps in our ability to gather significant intelligence data on a timely basis.

In summary, I believe we should be very careful of what we wish for. Before terminating or restricting the IC’s ability to collect critical intelligence, think what the consequences of such actions might be.

–Robert Gast of Reno is a former Assistant Director of the FBI.