Category Archives: Korea

Regarding The Prospect of North Korea Causing

Disruption with A Biological Weapon

by

James M Wilson V, MD FAAP
Director, Nevada Medical Intelligence Center
School of Community Health Science
University of Nevada-Reno

The prospect of armed conflict with North Korea weighs heavily on all of our minds right now, particularly given that we appear to be dealing with a regime seemingly impervious to diplomacy and international sanctions. While the world is (and should be) primarily concerned with scenarios involving nuclear and conventional weapons engagements, it is worthwhile to pause and consider other scenarios whispered over beers among analysts.

In my world, we fret over the specter of biological weapons. We fret because history has shown us other recalcitrant, isolated regimes who have ignored instruments such as the 1925 Geneva Protocol and 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). A quick review of the official BWC website does not reassure us that North Korea is a committed signatory (see the number of meetings they have attended in recent years, for example). Most analysts in health security and biodefense consider North Korea to have an offensive biological weapons program. Indeed, history has shown us political instruments like the Geneva Protocol and BWC have proven un-enforceable. Examples include the Germans and Japanese in World War II, the former Soviet Union’s biological warfare program, and recently re-examined allegations of mass-scale biological weapon deployments in Rhodesia in the late 1970s .

Biological weapons can be deployed in a surreptitious manner. While classic military strategists focus on aerosol deployment on the battlefield (or, in the case of the Koreas, across the DMZ) to target military forces, the smart bioweaponeer might take a page from the Japanese Imperial Army’s Unit 731 . Unit 731 viewed biological weapons as a means to disrupt, confuse, or stress the enemy’s civil infrastructure prior to attack with conventional weapons. Under this kind of scenario, any unusual infectious disease activity in South Korea should prompt rapid verification and response.

However, the world continues to have several major problems in a bio-warfare environment. One is determining attribution. While it is generally believed that any confirmed offensive biological weapon deployment would be answered with a nuclear response, this is in reality a difficult policy to execute. The reality is the world of public health has shown us a disturbing inability to proper assess risk, communicate that risk in a well-considered, balanced manner to stakeholders, conduct effective surveillance and response operations, and clearly demonstrate claimed “lessons learned” have indeed been… learned. Recent uncomfortable examples include the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, Ebola disaster, Zika crisis, and the currently unfolding antimicrobial resistance disaster. Credibility in the public health enterprise has been badly eroded, and the world currently lacks an effective health security intelligence system coupled to an effective response mechanism. Biodefense and the instruments of monitoring compliance of the BWC are utterly reliant on public health infrastructure. That infrastructure has shown us, for decades now, that it is overwhelmed, slow to act, and highly resistant to calls for change. In the context of a scenario of North Korean “biological mischief” conducted in South Korea, this is a grave liability.

From the civil medical infrastructure perspective, we have observed South Korea’s public health behave in ways suggestive of lessons not learned in the wake of SARS. During the emergence of SARS, the US military raised serious concerns about whether effective surveillance and response could be conducted in the South Korean civil medical and public health infrastructure… and how that might affect combat effectiveness. This concern was validated during the introduction of MERS to South Korea. During that period, officials were slow to recognize the initial appearance of MERS in South Korea and information was suppressed to avoid anxiety, which impaired effective response. This is a common, unfortunate behavior among Ministries of Health throughout the world when confronted with unusual, non-routine outbreaks.

One may reasonably surmise that the South Korean government will behave in a similar manner in the hypothetical context of an outbreak of unusual, non-routine infectious disease, especially if that disease is associated with unusually high morbidity or mortality. And, particularly if questions of possible biological weapon deployments are raised. As seen with both SARS and MERS, it is impossible for any government to keep these types of crises hidden for long. The public eventually discovers rumors of the situation and takes matters into their own hands, often in response to their government’s lack of transparency. While rare, civil unrest and incendiary violence are potential outcomes in this kind of situation. It is important to note that state failure, however, has not been documented in known history due solely to an outbreak of disease.

So the uncomfortable scenario of a surreptitious deployment of rapidly transmissible disease in a high population dense environment like Seoul indeed could cause a high degree of disruption and distraction in an already politically charged environment. It would be naïve to think that South Korea’s public health and medical infrastructure would behave any differently than we have seen thus far: there will be information suppression and disorganized response with potential for civil unrest. As we saw with the Amerithrax investigation and the aforementioned Rhodesia anthrax epidemic, there is real potential for tremendous delays in proving attribution if North Korea actually did intentionally release a disease in South Korea. This of course assumes attribution could be proven at all. The reality is, there may be little the international community could do to stop such an event from happening, and there may be little the international community could do to prove attribution.

In summary, the world should continue to prioritize the obvious threat of nuclear engagement with North Korea, but also be mindful of alternative scenarios where North Korea could still cause tremendous mischief in the region, including initiating a biological attack!

 

Registration will close at 9 am on September 11th

Confronting North Korea

With

Ambassador Christopher Hill

 

With a record number of attendees already registered we will be closing registration at 9 am on Monday September 11th.

The Sands Regency, Tuesday September 12, 2017, 9:00 a.m.

North Korea’s test of an intercontinental ballistic missile was a major step forward in its growing capability to deliver ICBMs with nuclear warheads as far as the Western United States. The U.S. and its allies have pursued a number of steps to eliminate or at least restrict Pyongyang’s capability to deliver weapons armed with nuclear warheads over great distances, but nothing has worked. America and allies in the region have tried to fashion a diplomatic, negotiated agreement, but North Korea seems uninterested. The U.S. has also pursued sanctions against Pyongyang, and while they have had some domestic impact, they have been insufficient to change the course the North Korean dictator, Kim Jong-Un, is pursuing. Nor surprising, the Pentagon is drawing up plans for the implementation of various military options, alternatives that now seem more possible given North Korean intransigence and President Trump’s threat to bring “Fire and Fury” on that country.

President Trump has also tried to persuade China, the one country that would seem to have leverage over North Korea, to join in the sanctions regime and to put additional diplomatic and economic pressure on Pyongyang. Beijing seems uninterested in assisting in restricting North Korean aggression and in opening up the country to foreign influences. In fact, new data shows that China’s trade with its North Korean neighbor has increased substantially this year, including sending much needed food, fuel and machinery to sustain the North Korean economy. China clearly is unwilling to do Washington’s bidding and put pressure on Pyongyang.

This makes the “military option” that much more likely. Such a preemptive operation would likely include a “surgical strike” on North Korean missile sites to remove its capability of launching ICBMs. The attack would likely include strikes against the country’s political leadership, including Kim Jong Un. In addition, the US/allied preemption would likely include a massive cyber attack designed to destroy the North’s communications systems and military command and control. However, such a strike would probably lead to Pyongyang hitting back hard with thousands of artillery rounds landing in South Korea and, possibly, Japan. That would likely kill hundreds of thousands, including U.S. troops stationed in both countries.  In sum, there are no good options for dealing with an intransigent North Korean regime, but a decision regarding a preemptive strike is likely to be forthcoming soon.

Ambassador Chris Hill is uniquely qualified to speak to this challenge. Hill is the former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, during which time he served as the head of the U.S. delegation to the Six Party Talks on the North Korea nuclear issue. He has also served as the American Ambassador to Iraq, Poland, and Macedonia, and as Senior Director on the staff of the National Security Council. He currently is the Dean of the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver.

Click here to RSVP

 Please join us for what will be a very interesting discussion. A full breakfast will be served ($15 Members, $25 Non-Members, and $10 for students with ID and military personnel in uniform; free for WWII Veterans). We recommend that you arrive by 8:30 to enjoy some breakfast, coffee and conversation.